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In re Hughes, 136 Nev. Adv. Op. 46 (July 16, 2020)1
JUDICIAL DISCIPLINE: CONTEMPT OF COURT IN FAMILY LAW DISPUTES
Summary
A judge who modified a mother’s custody rights was disciplined by the Nevada
Commission on Judicial Discipline. The Commission found that the judge held the mother in
contempt for failing to comply with the father’s visitation rights, but the judge did not allow the
mother to rebut the judge’s finding. In addition, the judge modified the mother’s custody rights
of the child, which the Commission found was a sanction to holding the mother in contempt. The
Commission ordered the judge to be publicly reprimanded and take a mandatory course on
family law. The judge appealed the Commission’s disciplinary actions. The Court held that,
when taking all the facts into context, the judge did not hold the mother in contempt, but instead
admonished the mother and scheduled a show-cause hearing to then decide whether or not to
hold the mother in contempt. The Court also held that the custody rights modification was not a
sanction to holding the mother in contempt, but was made for the best interest of the child. The
Court reversed the Commission’s disciplinary actions because there was no showing of a
deliberate or knowing violation, and there were no aggravating factors found.
Background
Judge Hughes is a family court judge who took over a pending divorce decree when she
began her judgeship. The divorce decree between the mother and father granted shared joint
custody over their child, in which the mother had primary custody and the father had weekend
visitation rights. The father was unhappy with the mother’s transfer of the child on the weekends.
Judge Hughes held a status check regarding the weekend exchanges. During that hearing,
Judge Hughes admonished the mother that if she did not participate in the weekend exchanges
with the father, she would be held in contempt. However, this admonishment was never
recorded. A month later, Judge Hughes found that the mother still did not participate in the
weekend exchanges with the father, and thus, violated the father’s parental rights and Judge
Hughes’ previous order. Judge Hughes allegedly found the mother in contempt from her
previous admonishment and ordered another hearing with the child present.
Judge Hughes granted the father temporary sole custody of the child. Judge Hughes
reasoned this order based on her belief that it would be in the child’s best interest to grant the
father temporary sole custody because the mother was not complying with the weekend
exchanges and hindering the child’s relationship with the father.
At the next hearing, Judge Hughes did not hold the mother in contempt because the
admonishment from the prior hearing was never recorded, so according to the record, there was
nothing to hold the mother in contempt of.
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The mother filed a disciplinary complaint to the Nevada Commission on Judicial
Discipline (Commission) regarding Judge Hughes’ decision to hold the mother in contempt. The
Commission charged Judge Hughes for holding the mother in contempt without allowing the
mother an opportunity to contest the contempt order and punishing the mother for not complying
with the admonishment by lessening the mother’s custody rights. Judge Hughes replied to the
charges, claiming that she did not formally hold the mother in contempt, but found only a prima
facie case of contempt and set to hold a show-cause hearing for the mother to rebut the prima
facie case at a later time. Judge Hughes also claimed that she reduced the mother’s custody rights
because she thought it was in the best interest for the child, not as a punishment.
The Commission found that Judge Hughes did find the mother in contempt without
giving the mother the opportunity to rebut that finding and used the finding of contempt as
justification for lessening the mother’s custody rights. Because of these findings, the
Commission ruled that Judge Hughes violated five canons of the Code of Judicial Conduct and
sentenced Judge Hughes to a public reprimand and a mandatory course at the National Judicial
College to better handle family law issues. Judge Hughes appealed the Commission’s findings
and sentence.
Discussion
The Court will defer to the Commission’s findings if there was clear and convincing
evidence in the record to support those findings.2
Clear and convincing evidence does not support the Commission's findings that Judge Hughes
held the mother in contempt and that Judge Hughes changed the custodial arrangement as a
contempt sanction.
The Court held that there was not clear and convincing evidence that Judge Hughes held
the mother in contempt for not following her visitation order and lessened the mother’s custody
rights as a punishment for being in contempt. Judge Hughes’ order asserting that the mother was
in contempt for respecting the father’s visitation rights also established a show-cause hearing at a
later date for the mother to respond before being found in contempt. Thus, the Court found Judge
Hughes’ order to be ambiguous because there were two possible interpretations from it.3 Because
the order was ambiguous, the Court reviewed Judge Hughes’ order as a whole and applied the
interpretation that was most reasonable with the facts and law.4
The Court found that, taking the facts and order as a whole, Judge Hughes’ order did not
hold the mother in contempt. The contempt by the mother was indirect because it did not occur
in front of Judge Hughes. Indirect contempt cannot be immediately sanctioned because there are
necessary procedural safeguards that must be respected before adjudicating and sanctioning
someone for contempt. 5 The mother was subject to civil contempt by Judge Hughes’ order
because Judge Hughes wanted to correct the mother’s noncompliance with the visitation order.
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Thus, Judge Hughes’ contempt order was meant to ensure the mother’s future compliance with
the visitation order, which would be reviewed at the show-cause hearing; if the mother was still
shown not to have complied with the contempt order at that hearing, then Judge Hughes’ would
have ruled that the mother was in contempt and issued the mother a sanction. In addition, Judge
Hughes found only a prima facie case for contempt, which the mother could have rebutted at the
show-cause hearing. Lastly, Judge Hughes’ order only addressed possible sanctions for being
found in contempt, but did not issue any upon the mother.
The Court also found that there was not clear and convincing evidence that Judge
Hughes’ modification of the custody rights between the mother and father was a sanction on the
mother for being in contempt. The modification of custody rights was in the best interest of the
child. Judge Hughes found that the mother was alienating the child from the father, which was
not in the best interest of the child. While Judge Hughes did tell the mother that continuing to not
comply with the visitation order would result in being found in contempt, Judge Hughes did not
ever state that the mother was already in contempt. In addition, Judge Hughes scheduled a later
hearing to review the mother’s compliance and then to decide to hold the mother in contempt.
Judge Hughes had the authority to issue a temporary custody change before holding the
mother in contempt.6 Also, the Court ruled that a review of a judge’s abuse of discretion is for an
appellate court, and not the Commission, to decide.7
Because Judge Hughes did not find the mother in contempt prior to a show-cause hearing
and did not modify the mother’s custody rights as a sanction to finding the mother in contempt,
Judge Hughes did not violate any of the canons of the Code of Judicial Conduct.
The statutes governing judicial discipline do not support the discipline imposed based on the
Commission's findings.
After finding that Judge Hughes violated the Code of Judicial Conduct, the Commission
ordered Judge Hughes to be publically reprimanded and take a mandatory family law course at
the National Judicial College.
The Court noted that a judge can be sanctioned, and sanctions vary based on the judge’s
misconduct.8 However, the Court also stated that a public reprimand is a severe sanction, one
that may only be issued if aggravating factors are present or if the violation is not knowing or
deliberate. 9 The Court held that Judge Hughes did not commit any knowing or deliberate
violation of the Code of Judicial Conduct and that there were no aggravating factors justifying a
public reprimand. At most, Judge Hughes should have been punished with a public
admonishment or censure.10
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Conclusion
The Commission failed to put into context Judge Hughes’ order when it found that Judge
Hughes violated the Code of Judicial Conduct. The facts establish that Judge Hughes did not find
the mother in contempt before a show-cause hearing and that Judge Hughes’ decision to lessen
the mother’s custody rights was in the best interest of the child, not a sanction based upon a
finding of contempt. In addition, a public reprimand was not an appropriate form of discipline
because there was no showing that Judge Hughes deliberately or knowingly violated the Code of
Judicial Conduct and there were no aggravating factors present to justify a public reprimand. The
Court reversed the Commission’s decision.
Concurring in part and Dissenting in part
Judge Cadish and Judge Silver agreed with the majority of the Court that the Commission
should not have imposed a public reprimand on Judge Hughes. However, they believed that
Judge Hughes should have received some form of punishment because Judge Hughes did violate
some canons of the Code of Judicial Conduct, specifically, violations that are not knowing or
deliberate and are absent aggravating factors.

